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INPARIDELICTO AND CROP GENE PATENTS:




The landmark Supreme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty'
opened the floodgates for patenting eligible living organisms and transgenic
technologies, 2  while J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc.3 unequivocally confirmed the right to file utility patents
for sexually reproducing plants.4 Since then, farmer use of genetically
modified (GM) plant species - plants which have man-made alterations to
their genome so that non-naturally occurring traits are expressed - has
become the norm rather than the exception. In fact, in 2005 the billionth
acre of crop planted from GM seeds was harvested.
Plants are living organisms capable of producing pollen and seeds,
and are thus able to replicate without human intervention. Besides merely
producing offspring, the character of pollen and the nature of genetics are
such that a plant's genes may spread for many miles so that far away plants
ultimately express these genes too.6 Therefore, a farmer may unknowingly,
unintentionally, and innocently grow plants expressing patented genes
because a patent holder has introduced into the environment a self-
propagating life form capable of disseminating a patented gene onto another
farmer's lands without human aid.7 In fact, human intervention cannot
* David Costa is a member of the patent bar, holds a J.D. from the University of Florida
Frederick G. Levin College of Law with a certificate in Intellectual Property, a Ph.D. in Medical
Sciences from the University of South Florida Department of Biochemisty and Molecular Biology, and
a M.S. in Biomedical Engineering from the University of South Florida, College of Engineering.
'Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
2 Id. at 309 (1980) ("Here, . . the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His
discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable .....").
3 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
4 Id. at 127 ("We hold that utility patents may be issued for plants").
' Monsanto, Company History, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/monsanto-
history.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
6 See generally Ken Belcher et. al., Genetically Modified Crops and Agricultural
Landscapes: Spatial Patterns of Contamination, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECONoMICs 387 (2005).
7 See Norman Siebrasse, The Innocent Bystander Problem in the Patenting of Higher Life
Forms. 49 MCGILL L.J. 349, 356-57 (2004).
KY J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
contain the spread of genetic material between plants once a genetically
modified plant is released into the world ecosystem.'
Technology is ever changing, and the patent system was not
developed with such scenarios in mind. Congress and the courts therefore
must adapt to promote the just adjudication of such cases. As it stands, any
unauthorized acquisition and subsequent planting of seeds expressing
patented genes is infringement, and therein lies the heart of the legal
conundrum addressed in this Article. The Federal statute defining
infringement, 35 USC §271(a), states that "whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention" infringes upon a
patent.9 No element of intent therefore is required to find infringement.
Thus, when a farmer innocently and unintentionally grows a crop
containing a patented gene, that farmer, by the letter of the law, is
infringing that patent and has little recourse when an infringement action is
brought in court. This issue specifically arises because of the special nature
of plant gene patents.
A recent Canadian Supreme Court case, Monsanto Canada Inc. v.
Schmeiser, brought this precise issue to the world legal stage, but due to the
specific circumstances of the case, the court failed to rule on the issue of
"innocent infringement" by farmers.'o Several court cases have hinted at
the subject in dicta, but no case law exists directly addressing the matter.
This Article posits that strict liability for patent infringement applied to a
truly innocently infringing farmer cannot possibly yield a just outcome.
The common law equitable doctrine of in pari delicto, which basically
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages arising out of misconduct for
which the plaintiff bears responsibility," should be an available defense to
innocent farmers faced with charges of infringement, for such infringement
is unavoidable due to the nature of plant reproduction.
It should be noted that while this Article focuses almost exclusively
on farmers and the unintentional growing of patented crop varieties, the
discussions herein are not limited to farmers and plants, but can be applied
to any life form capable of harboring patented genes and spreading those
genes to future generations without human intervention.
II. GENETICS 101
Whether it be a canola plant, a white rhinoceros, or the bacteria
under one's fingernails, the basics of genetics remains the same for each
8 Henry Daniell, Molecular Strategies for Gene Containment in Transgenic Crops, 20
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 581, 585 (2002).
9 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
10 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2 (Can.).
" See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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organism. The focus of this particular lesson is the genesis and formation
of proteins. Proteins are the major macromolecular component of the cell,
and are constructed from a series of amino acids linearly bound to each
other.12 Proteins are responsible for a myriad of duties in an organism
including inter alia the catalysis of biological reactions (enzymes),13
mechanical functions (such as the actin and myosin proteins responsible for
actuating the movement of muscle tissue), 14 and transport functions
(oxygen transport via hemoglobin tetramers)." A cell constructs proteins
from amino acids as needed, but how does a cell know how to make such a
wide variety of proteins from a limited variety of amino acids? The answer
is via deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
DNA is the central "blueprint" contained in each cell of an
organism.16 In simple terms, DNA can be thought of as a long string of
pearls, each "pearl" being a nucleotide.17 It is this very specific sequence of
nucleotides which contains the instructions or code for making particular
proteins." When a gene is "expressed" this means that the cell finds and
exposes a particular stretch of DNA - a gene - and makes a working
copy of this master DNA blueprint.19 This copy is comprised of RNA
(ribonucleic acid), and it, like DNA, is a series of nucleotides.20 Complex
cellular machinery can "read" the sequence of the RNA (the copy of the
master blueprint, so to say), translate it, and ultimately construct a sequence
of amino acids based on the instructions provided.2 1 The result is a string of
particular amino acids, a polypeptide, that are originally encoded by the
cell's DNA.22 This polypeptide string, via modification by other cellular
machinery or merely intermolecular forces, will fold into a particular shape;
it is this three-dimensional molecule that is referred to as a protein. 23 The
variety and number of amino acids is such that the variety and number of
protein variants is unimaginably large. For example, the human species
alone is estimated to have over three billion base pairs of DNA in each cell,
12 See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL Il 1 (Garland Publishing
Inc., 3rd ed. 1994).
13 See id. at 128.
14 See id. at 847.
15 See HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 74-75 (W.H. Freeman and Co.,
4t' ed. 2000).
16 See generally id. at 101.7 Id. The four nucleotides of DNA are Adenine, Guanine, Thymine, and Cytosine.
" JOCELYN KREBS ET AL., LEWIN'S GENES X (Jones & Bartlett 2009).
9 Id.
20 Lodish, supra note 15 at 101 (stating RNA, Uracil is substituted for Thymine).
21 Id. at 102.
22 Id. at 100-01.
23 id
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making up between 20,000 and 25,000 genes, 24 which code for at least that
many proteins.25
Each organism expresses its own repertoire of proteins, with
variations existing within and between species. When a plant variety, or
any other living organism (a show dog, for example), is "bred," the hope is
that over time, with careful selection, the most desired traits (physical
expressions of an underlying gene) are more often, or even permanently,
expressed. Selective breeding is merely a means to select the desired genes,
and, more importantly for the breeder, the proteins expressed in a particular
familial line of an organism in order to acquire certain desired physical
characteristics. 26  The process is essentially one of evolution in which
desirable traits are naturally selected, but in the case of selective breeding
this process is accelerated by human intervention. Though technically
selective breeding results in an end product containing a certain compliment
of desired genes, in the modem realm of science, "genetically modified"
means something quite different.
Modern genetics allows for pinpoint accuracy of genetic changes,
and, more importantly, allows for combinations of genes that would
otherwise be impossible in nature. Selective breeding is limited to
organisms that are capable of reproducing with each other. For example,
breeding canola with other strains of canola would, and does, work over
time, but it would be quite impossible to breed a canola plant with a giraffe.
Transgenic technology allows DNA sequences from one organism to be
expressed in a wholly unrelated organism,27 and has become a rather
common tool in biological science28 and agriculture. 29  A transgenic
organism incorporates exogenous DNA sequences into its own genome, and
24 NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A GUIDE TO YOUR GENOME 4,
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/Education
/AllAbouttheHumanGenomeProject/GuidetoYourGenome07.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
25 Id.
26 Gregor J. Mendel, Versuche iiber Pflanzenhybriden Verhandlungen des naturforschenden
Vereines in Brinn, Bd. IV Abhandlungen:3-47 (1865).
27 See Gareth Cook, Cross Hare: Hop and Glow, BOSTON GLOBE, September 17, 2000, at
A01, available at http://ekac.org/bostong.html (illustrating an infamous example of transgenic
technology where a glowing jellyfish protein was expressed in a white rabbit, yielding a bunny that
glows under a black light).
28 See generally David Costa et al., Enrichment Improves Cognition in AD Mice by Amyloid-
related and Unrelated Mechanisms, 28(6) NEUROBIOLOGY OF AGING 831 (2007); David Costa et al.,
Apolipoprotein is Required for the Formation of Filamentous Amyloid but not for Amorphous Abeta
Deposition, in an AbetaPP/PS Double Transgenic Mouse Model of Alzheimer's Disease, 6(5) J.
ALZHEIMERS DISEASE 509 (2004). These sources provide two examples of my own research using
transgenic mice that express human Alzheimer's Disease (AD) genes, resulting in mice that exhibit AD
pathology and behavioral symptoms.
29 See Juan J. Estruch et al., Transgenic Plants: An Emerging Approach to Pest Control, 15
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 137, 137 (1997) (outlining the potential of transgenic crops to combat insect
damage to crops).
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expresses this "foreign" DNA as if it were naturally part of that organism;
therefore it expresses a protein that, in nature, is found in a different
organism.30
III. MONSANTO'S TECHNOLOGY
Monsanto Company, a leader in agricultural products, is the
world's largest seed company31 and offers a range of genetically engineered
seeds that are protected by a large patent portfolio.32  In the early 1970s,
Monsanto developed and patented the herbicide glyphosate.33 Glyphosate
[N-(phosphonomethyl)glycine] is a broad spectrum herbicide that
selectively targets and inhibits the action of the enzyme EPSP Synthase.34
This enzyme is responsible for a crucial step in a biological pathway that,
when disrupted, is thought to prevent a plant from synthesizing proteins,
therefore resulting in the plant's death.35  Glyphosate has become the
world's most used agrochemical because it specifically targets all higher
plant species, is relatively non-toxic to other species. and does not readily
leach into ground water 7. The first two decades after its discovery,
glyphosate was used only as a broad spectrum herbicide.38 Monsanto has
since further capitalized on the success of glyphosate by creating and
patenting a number of crops, including canola, which are immune or largely
resistant to glyphosate.39 In particular, it was discovered that the CP4 gene
of bacteria from the genus Agrobacterium expressed a variety of the EPSP
Synthase enzyme that was resistant to glyphosate.40 Monsanto therefore
developed transgenic crops which express the Agrobacterium CP4 gene,
resulting in plants that do not die when exposed to glyphosate, for they
30 David A. Andow & Angelika Hilbeck, Science-Based Risk Assessment for Nontarget
Effects of Transgenic Crops, 54 BIOSCIENCE 637, 638 (2004) (stating that genetic modifications are not
limited to the expression of genes from other species. Mutations may be conferred upon an organism,
genes may be selectively expressed temporally or regionally, and native genes may be "knocked out" so
that a particular protein is not expressed).
31 ETC Group, World's Top 10 Seed Companies, http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/615 (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010) (showing Monsanto selling $4,028 million seeds in 2006 as compared to the next
largest company, Dupont, which sold only @,781 million seeds in the same year).
32 See generally Agricultural Seeds, http://www.monsanto.com/products/seedstraits.asp (last
visited Feb. 13, 2011). A March, 2010 Google search of "Patents" yielded over 540 patents assigned to
the Monsanto Company.
3 3Alan Baylis, Why Glyphosate is a Global Herbicide: Strengths, Weaknesses and Prospects,
56 PEST MGMT. SCI. 299, 299 (2000).
34 Stephen Duke & Stephen Powles, Glyphosate: A Once-in-a-Century Herbicide, 64 PEST
MGMT. SC. 319, 319 (2008).EPSPS stands for 5-enolpyruvyl-shikimate-3-phosphate synthase.
s Id. at 320.
36 Baylis, supra note 33, at 306.
3 Duke & Powles, supra note 34, at 320.
38 id.
3 See Canadian Patent No. 1,313,830 (filed Aug. 6, 1986).
40 Duke & Powles, supra note 34, at 321-22.
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produce enough transgenic EPSP Synthase proteins to be resistant to the
herbicide. 41  Roundup is the trade name for the glyphosate herbicide
marketed and sold by Monsanto, and so Monsanto logically markets crops
containing these Roundup resistant genes as "Roundup Ready."4 2  The
adoption rate of Monsanto's Roundup Ready crops in North America has
been staggering, with over 80 % of all U.S. soybeans43 and over 75% of
U.S. canola" containing glyphosate resistance genes by 2003.
Once Monsanto, or any other entity, creates a transgenic crop line,
the resulting organism possesses a relatively permanent addition to its
genome. 5 These genes, like the natural genes encompassed by a plant's
genome, will be passed to future plant generations.46 This movement of
genes, called gene flow, is mediated by both seed dispersal and pollen
transfer.47  Seed-mediated gene flow primarily occurs via human
intervention - namely stray seed may make their way to other farms via
rental farm machinery or contaminated storage and hauling means.48 Also,
wind, animal, and insect transfer mediates pollen movement.49  Studies
show that the pollen of wind-blown crops can travel and pollinate other
plants as far as 144 kilometers away.so Similarly, insects (bees in
particular) are capable of disseminating pollen at distances of up to several
kilometers.5 ' Whatever the route, farmers growing organic or non-
genetically modified crops are at a high risk of having their crops
contaminated with laboratory-modified genes. The legal ramifications are
such that when a farmer's previously non-genetically modified canola
crosses with pollen from a Roundup Ready plant, the resulting seeds and
plants can contain genes patented by Monsanto, leading to claims of
infringement. What is a farmer to do in this case?
41 See id .
42 See Backgrounder: History of Monsanto's Glyphosate Herbicides, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/products/Documents/glyphosate-background-materials/back history.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2011).
43 Leonard Gianessi, Economic and Herbicide Use Impacts of Glyphosate-Resistant Crops,
61 PEST MGMT. SC. 241, 242 (2005).
4 Id. at 244.
45 See generally Mary Rieger et al. Risks of Gene Flow From Transgenic Herbicide-Resistant
Canola (Brassica napus) to Weedy Relatives in Southern Australian Cropping Systems, 50 AuST. J.
AGRIC. RES., 115 (1999).
4 See generally id.
4 Id. at 117.
48 See id. at 119.
49 Id. at 117.
so L.S. Watrud et al., Evidence for Landscape-Level, Pollen-Mediated Gene Flow from
Genetically Modified Creeping Bentgrass with CP4 EPSPS as a Marker, 101 PROC. NATL. AcAD. Scl.
14533, 14533 (2004); see also G. Squire et al., The Potential for Oilseed Rape Feral (Volunteer) Weeds
to Cause Impurities in Later Oilseed Rape Crops (Dep't for.Env't, Food, & Rural Affairs Aug. 2003).
" Rieger, supra note 45, at 118.
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IV. THE FARMERS
Traditionally, a farmer would need to till the soil in which their
crops would grow before a planting season to help minimize weeds and
soil-incorporated herbicides. After tilling, the land would additionally be
treated with herbicides to further reduce the growth of unwanted weeds.53
Besides the time, labor, and expense of tilling, the farmer would need to
wait until the herbicide potency sufficiently waned so as to not adversely
affect the crops planted in the future. The development of Roundup Ready
crops has vastly simplified this process, for planting seed resistant to
glyphosate allows the application of herbicide after the desired crop has
sprouted, killing surrounding weeds, and therefore 1) minimizing the use of
additional herbicides; 2) eliminating the need to excessively fallow the
land, thus saving labor expenditures while maintaining ground moisture;
and 3) allowing the farmer to plant seeds earlier in the season, for the need
to delay for pre-planting herbicide applications is eliminated.54
Additionally, glyphosate is one of the safest herbicides on the market to
humans. 5 With such clear advantages over traditional crops it is not
56
surprising that many farmers have switched to Roundup Ready crops.
When a farmer purchases Roundup Ready seed from Monsanto or
an authorized agent, he/she also purchases the right to use the patented
genetic technology the seed expresses.57 Monsanto requires any farmer
who wishes to grow Roundup Ready canola to sign a 'Technology Use
Agreement," (TUA) which subjects the farmers to a number of licensing
terms. 8 In particular, farmers may not sell or give seed to any third party,
may only use seed for a single crop season, and may not save seed for
following harvests. 59 They must also purchase Roundup branded herbicide
with the TUA as a package and must allow Monsanto to inspect their crops
and to remove crop samples from their land for testing.60 Lastly, farmers
52 See NICHOLAS G. KALAITZANDONAKES, THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
OF AGBIOTECH: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 19-63, 56 (Kluwer Academic 2003).
53 id.
54 See Genuity Roundup Ready Canola, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/
ag_products/input traits
/products/roundupreadycanola .asp (listing purported benefits of Roundup Ready Canola)
(last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
5s See Duke & Powles, supra note 37, at 320 (stating that "there should be no human health
safety issues with glyphosate).
56 See id. at 322 (providing statistics for the adoption rate of GR crops in different countries).
5 Technology Use Agreement, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.ca/seedstraits/tual
default.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
"See Technology Use Agreement, PERCY SCHMEISER, http://www.percyschmeiser.com/
TUA.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Monsonto TUA].
60 id
1852010-2011]
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must pay a licensing fee of $15.00 per acre of canola planted in addition to
the price of the seed and fertilizer.6 1 If a farmer gives away or sells seed to
a third party or even saves their own seed to plant in future years, this
would not only be a contractual violation on the part of the farmer
conveying the seed, but also patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
by the party receiving seed as the use is without Monsanto's consent.62
Despite the apparent benefits of planting Roundup Ready crops,
farmers have not universally adopted the technology.63 This could be for
any number of reasons, such as the desire to grow non-genetically modified
crops (some export markets prohibit or limit the importation of genetically
modified agricultural products) 64 , the intent to grow organic crops, or
merely the hope to avoid entering into a contractual agreement with
Monsanto that severely restricts a farmer's freedoms. 5 A particularly
unpopular provision, and the genesis of many lawsuits, is the TUA
provision which expressly prohibits the saving of seed.66  It is a long-
established agricultural custom for farmers to retain some of the current
67
year's harvested seed for use in future harvests. By reusing their own
seed, a farmer saves money over the roughly $40 to $50 per acre that
Monsanto charges for their Roundup Ready seeds.68 Additionally, once a
farmer grows a single crop year of Roundup Ready plants, any seeds that
develop and fall to the soil could grow the following season and constitute
an infringing use of patented technology should the farmer decide to switch
to a non-Roundup Ready crop. This effectively locks a farmer into
purchasing genetically modified seeds every year, which could be an
unpalatable option for some.
It is those farmers choosing not to embrace Monsanto's technology,
yet innocently and inadvertently harbor their invention, who are the focus
of this Article. It is posited that a spectrum of inadvertent user classes
should be recognized by the judiciary.69 Specifically, a farmer who
inadvertently grows patented crops should only be liable for infringement to
the extent of the benefit derived from the use of the patented genes. There
61 Monsanto, 1 S.C.R. 902 5.
62 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
63 Duke & Powles, supra note 37, at 322.
6 Kynda R. Curtis and Klaus Moeltner, Genetically Modified Food Market Participation and
Consumer Risk Perceptions: A Cross-Country Comparison, 54 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 289, 204-06
(2006).
65 id
66 Monsonto TUA, supra note 62.
67 Jason Barron, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies: Do the Potential Environmental
Harms Outweigh the Economic Benefits, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 271, 272 (2008).
68 Karen McMahon, Roundup Ready Seed Prices Increase, Farm Industry News (Aug. 31,
2004), http://farmindustrynews.com/roundup-ready-seed-prices-increase (last visited Feb. 13, 2011)
(prices based upon the seed cost in 1996). .
69 See Siebrasse, supra note 8, at 357.
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are three potential benefit classes under which an unintentional user may
fall: (1) an unintentional, non-benefiting infringer; (2) an unintentional,
benefiting infringer; and (3) an unintentional, non-benefiting infringer that
has the potential opportunity to benefit.70 It is proposed that an
unintentional, benefiting infringer should be held liable to the extent that
they benefited from using the invention.7 1 Under this benefits-based theory,
for example, if a patented gene was engineered to produce a higher crop
yield, the additional profits earned over that of planting a non-GM variety
would be the extent to which a farmer would be held liable for
infringement.
In the Monsanto case introduced in the next section, the situation is
not as straight forward. The patented gene conferring Roundup resistance
did not actually cause an increase in crop yield, or confer any actual
advantage to the defendant, Percy Schmeiser, for he never took advantage
72of the Roundup Ready genes since he did not apply Roundup to his crops.
However, the court recognized that Schmeiser derived a benefit from the
patented invention's stand-by or insurance value, meaning that Schmeiser
could, at any time, decide to use the glyphosate resistance to his
advantage.73 The court compared this to keeping a fire extinguisher, yet
never using it; the option to use it is still always there.74 These scenarios
highlight the complexities inherent in the issues of innocent infringement.
The discussion this article provides is from a position assuming a totally
innocent infringer who did not benefit from the patented gene.
V. MONSANTO CANADA INC. V. SCHMEISER
The Monsanto case brought the issue of "innocent infringement" by
farmers to the world stage. Percy Schmeiser was a Canadian farmer from
the province of Saskatchewan who had grown crops, including canola, for
over 50 years.75 Though Schmeiser historically grew non-genetically
modified canola, in 1996 at least five nearby (one being adjacent) farmers
to Schmeiser grew genetically modified canola containing genes that had
been patented by Monsanto.76 It should be noted that by the year 2000, it
was estimated that between 4.5 and 5 million acres, roughly 40%, of all
canola grown in Canada contained Monsanto's glyphosate resistance
70 See id.
71 See id. at 369.
72 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] 202 F.T.R. 78 TT 11, 31 (Can.).
7 See Monsanto, 1 S.C.R. 902 47.
74 id
71 Id. at TT 1, 4.
'6 Id. at T 5, 60.
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genes. 77 Schmeiser never purchased genetically modified seed, nor did he
ever have a license to plant it.78  In 1998, Monsanto secretly tested
Schmeiser's crop and claimed that the canola grown by Schmeiser was 95%
to 98% Roundup resistant.79 Monsanto brought a patent infringement suit
against Schmeiser, alleging Schmeiser had grown and sold Roundup Ready
canola without a license.so
In the trial, Schmeiser contended that he was an innocent
bystander.8' He maintained that he did not know how the patented seeds
came to be on his land and surmised that they may have blown onto his
land from nearby farms, transferred by insects, or arrived from passing
trucks carrying seed that were inadvertently blown from the transport
vehicle. A legally fatal act for Schmeiser was that in prior planting
seasons he sprayed a portion of his crop with roundup, eventually
harvesting the canola that survived the herbicide application and saving that
seed for future seasons.83 This act combined with the large percentage of
Roundup Ready canola that Schmeiser was growing, led the trial court to
find that "none of the suggested sources could reasonably explain the
concentration or extent of Roundup Ready canola of a commercial quality
evident from the results of tests on Schmeiser's crop." 84 In addition, the
trial court found that the Monsanto patent was valid, despite proffered
arguments of patent invalidity, and further found that Schmeiser used the
patented product in violation of the Canadian Patent Act." The Canadian
Federal Court of Appeals upheld the decision, and the Supreme Court of
Canada, though altering the damages calculation, affirmed that Schmeiser
was liable for infringing Monsanto's patent.86
Schmeiser, in attacking the validity of the patent, argued that
replication of the patented gene was a natural mechanism, requiring no
human intervention, and that it could not be contained or controlled.
Furthermore, he observed that since varieties of canola may naturally cross
in the wild, different varieties that were not contemplated by the patent
7Id. at 1 10.
7 Id. at 6.
7 Schmeiser, 202 F.T.R. 78 1 64.
so Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] 202 F.T.R. 78 TT 8-9, rev'd in part, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
" Id. at 115.
82 Id. at 116-17.
83 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 61-64 (Can.).
84 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] 202 F.T.R. 78 TT 118, rev'd in part, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
85 Id at 90; See Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 (Can.).
86 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, 89 (Can. C.A.); Monsanto Can. Inc.
v. Schemeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, T 97 (Can.).
87 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 202 F.T.R. 78 T 78 (Can.).
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would arise. Therefore, Schmeiser argued, that the patent should be
invalidated as non-patentable subject matter.89 The court disagreed with
this argument, and held that nothing in the patent act or related court
precedent precludes the patenting of plants. 90 The above argument, though
not applied to the validity of plant patents, but rather used as a defense for
the "innocent infringer" is the central thesis of this Article.
Percy Schmeiser did not seem a mere innocent bystander, as he was
admittedly aware of the presence of Roundup Ready canola growing on his
land. 91 By spraying large swathes of crops with Roundup and saving the
surviving plants, it is difficult to believe that Schmeiser, a farmer for over
50 years, did not recognize the consequences of his actions-namely that he
would be growing plants that were resistant to Roundup. By saving these
survivor seeds and replanting them, Schmeiser was knowingly, as all three
courts found, growing plants expressing Monsanto's patented invention,
causing Schmeiser's innocent infringer defense to fail. The Canadian
Supreme Court, at the beginning of its opinion stated that "we emphasize
from the outset that we are not concerned here with the innocent discovery
by farmers of 'blow-by' patented plants on their land or in their cultivated
fields,"92 and then later observed that "[h]ad [Schmeiser] been a mere
'innocent bystander,' he could have refuted the presumption of use arising
from his possession of the patented gene and cell."9 The court, therefore
recognized the possibility of an innocent bystander defense (though the
dicta does not cite any authority for this proposition), but failed to rule on
the issue. However, the court went so far as to state that "if Parliament
wishes to respond legislatively to biotechnology inventions concerning
plants, it is free to do so. Thus far it has not chosen to do so." 94
In the case of a truly innocent infringer growing patented crops,
American farmers are in a particularly bad position as intent is not an
element of infringement under U.S. patent law. Should statutory silence on
an intent element be dispositive against innocent use?95 Why treat patented
crops differently than any other patented article? This article posits that
88 id.
89 Id
90 Id. at 81 (citing Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. 534 U.S.
124 (2001)).
91 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 202 F.T.R. 78 11 (Can.).
92 Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 2 (Can.).
9 Id. at 95.
94 id
9 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.").
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innocent use of patented crops should be a defense to a patent infringement
action. The following discussion will more specifically address this issue.
VI. AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE TO INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
A. Common Law Defenses in Equity Against Patent Infringement
Although the patent laws of the United States are codified in Title
35 of the United States Code, there are a number of non-statutory, yet well
established, precedents for applying common law legal defenses in equity
to patent infringement cases. In particular, defendants have the defenses of
laches and estoppel at their disposal to combat charges of infringement.96
Courts such as the 10h Circuit Court of Appeals hold that the
equitable defense of laches, or sleeping on one's rights, is available in
patent cases realizing that "it is inequitable for an infringer to deprive the
owner of a patent of royalties and other rights which the patent affords. It is
equally inequitable for the patent owner to sleep on his rights and lead an
infringer to make large investments in the belief that he is not infringing or
that the patent rights are not to be pressed."97 In particular, there exists a
six-year statute of limitations for the recovery of damages, 98 but according
to U.S. law, "[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent." 99 Courts thus have recognized that:
[s]ince the statute limits only the period for recovery of
damages, courts employ the traditional, equitable doctrine
of laches for determining the timeliness of infringement
actions. Courts use the six year statutory period for
damages, however, as a frame of reference for the
application of the doctrine. This is consistent with normal
equity practice which considers the passage of time
equivalent to a comparable statute of limitations as
presumptive of laches. 00
This is an excellent example of how a common law legal defense in
equity has been adapted to work within the confines and intent of codified
patent law.
96 See Potash Co. of Am. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 213 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1954)
(applying these doctrines in a patent case).
9 Id. at 156.
9 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1952) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had
for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim
for infringement in the action.").
* 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952).
"0o TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346, 348 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
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Similarly, U.S. courts adjudicating patent cases have also permitted
defendants to raise the common law defense of estoppel. "[t]o work an
estoppel, [a] defendant must normally show, in addition to laches, that he
was misled in some fashion by the plaintiff." 1' The defense of laches
arises when a plaintiff sits on his/her rights and fails to enforce an
infringement, but estoppel "arises only when one has so acted as to mislead
another and the one thus misled had relied upon the action of the inducing
party to his prejudice."l02 A successful defense of equitable estoppel
therefore requires actions on the part of the plaintiff that an ordinary
observer would infer as an intentional abandonment of a claim to
infringement, which, as a result, induced the defendant to believe that an
infringement was permissible.103 Again, the courts have adopted common
law principles of equity and incorporated them into the large body of patent
law.
The courts have also recognized an additional variant on the
common law principle of estoppel, implied license by estoppel. This
doctrine may also be used as a defense against patent infringement. This
analysis basically determines whether the behavior of the patent holder has
made a potential infringer a licensee by implication. In the seminal case of
De Forest Radio T & T v. U.S., AT&T, as licensee of a patented vacuum
tube, expressed permission for the U.S. government to manufacture the
licensed invention.'04 The U.S. Supreme Court prevented De Forest from
later claiming patent infringement on the grounds of implied license by
estoppel.'05 The Court stated that any "language used by the owner of the
patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to another, from which that
other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in
making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a
license."106  There is a long line of implied licensing cases, and "one
common thread in cases in which equitable estoppel applies is that the actor
committed himself to act, and indeed acted, as a direct consequence of
another's conduct. Thus, an implied license cannot arise out of the
unilateral expectations or even reasonable hopes of one party." 107 It would
therefore seem that an average farmer would, and should, know, especially
in light of the famous Schmeiser case, that Monsanto owns the patent on
"o Id. at 350.
102 Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1975)
(quoting Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1941)).,
103 See Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (7th Cir. 1972).
104 De Forest Radio Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. U.S., 273 U.S. 236, 236-239 (1927).
105 Id. at 242.
'o' Id. at 241.
107 Michael Swope, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Implied License An Emerging
Threat to Contributory Infringement Protection, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 291-94 (1995) (citing Stickle v.
Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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Roundup Ready crops and does not permit their use outside of a licensing
agreement. It would be difficult given their reputation for initiating
lawsuits, to show that Monsanto conveyed a message that would indicate to
a farmer that he would be allowed to possess Roundup Ready crops that are
unintentionally grown.
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. §283 provides that "the several courts
having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."'0 Though
not a defense against infringement, this exemplifies, yet again, the
codification and the specific legislative intent embodied in U.S. patent law
for courts to apply common law principles of equity to patent cases and to
do so at their discretion.
It is therefore suggested that the courts, in alignment with their
embrace of common law equitable defenses, allow allegedly innocently
infringing farmers the opportunity to proffer another common law
defense-in pari delicto-against suits of patent infringement when self-
propagating organisms harboring patented genes are intentionally released
into nature.
B. Equity: In Pari Delicto
During the last few centuries, the Anglo-American courts of
common law developed a well-established set of equitable defenses devised
to provide appropriate legal remedies, such as injunctive relief, when
monetary awards alone did not suffice to create a "fair" outcome.109 The
equitable maxim of in pari delicto serves as an affirmative defense
prohibiting a plaintiff from recovering damages arising out of misconduct
for which the plaintiff bears responsibility.1 0 "The expression 'in pan
delicto' is a portion of the longer Latin sentence, 'In pari delicto potior est
conditio defendantis,' which means that where the wrong of both parties is
equal, the position of the defendant is the stronger .... Equity looks beneath
rigid rules to find substantial justice and has the power to prevent strict
rules from working an injustice.""' This common law theory of equity is
not codified in U.S. patent law; yet, in the trial of SmithKline Beecham v.
Apotex, Judge Posner stated that "[a]lthough I cannot find any statutory
'0 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2011) (emphasis added).
'09 See 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 1 (2010).
110 27A AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 103 (2010).
1 Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts Fin. Group, Inc., 348 F.3d 230, 237 (7th Cir. Ind. 2003)
(quoting W. M. Moldoff, Annotation, Purchaser's Right To Set Up Invalidity of Contract Because of
Violation of State Securities Regulation as Affected by Doctrines of Estoppel or Pari Delicto, 84
A.L.R.2d 479, 491; and 12 Indiana Law Encyclopedia Equity § 3).
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language or case law that bears on the question, I believe that as a matter of
fundamental principle it must be a defense to a charge of patent
infringement that the patentee caused the infringement. There are many
analogies, but one will suffice: it is a completely orthodox defense to a suit
for breach of contract that the plaintiff prevented the defendant from
performing his contractual duty." 1 2
In this factually complex patent case, SmithKline held patent rights
for, and produced, a hemihydrate crystalline form of the compound
paroxetine."' The anhydrate crystalline product, as attempted to be
produced by Apotex, was found by the court not infringe the patent."14
However, the scientific principles of "disappearing polymorphs" and
"Ostwald's Rule," generally state that once a new polymorph appears in the
environment (in this case, the hemihydrate crystalline product), these later-
appearing, more stable crystal variants may cause the earlier form of the
crystal to become extinct (or at least make it virtually impossible' to
create the earlier polymorph in a laboratory or factory without also creating
the later polymorph).1 6 This conversion occurs via "seeding," where an
amount as small as tens of molecules of the hemihydrate could contaminate
an entire production plant and catalyze the conversion of anhydrate crystals
to the hemihydrate form.1 7  Therefore, SmithKline, by introducing the
hemihydrate form of the drug into the environment, effectively made the
production of the pure anhydrate form impossible. Said in infringement
terms, SmithKline's creation of the hemihadyrate makes it virtually
impossible for Apotex to not infringe the hemihydrate patent, despite their
best efforts to produce the public domain anyhydrous polymorph.
The case of Monsanto, or any other biotech company involved in
the patenting of transgenic organisms, the SmithKline case is highly
analogous. The creation of a transgenic organism capable of exponential
sexual reproduction is hardly different from a stable crystal polymorph
introduced into the environment. Once this organism is released into the
wild, it can never be taken back, thereby changing the genetic compliment
of an entire species on a world-wide scale. A single crop of Roundup
Ready canola releases pollen containing patented genes that will, by wind
112 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1043 (N.D. Il. 2003).
"' Id. at 1015.
114 Id. at 1052.
"s Id at 1021-22 (An expert in the case testified that "[I]f Apotex, desperate to avoid a
charge of infringement, built a new plant in Antarctica where no hemihydrate seeds had ever been and
started manufacturing anhydrate there, and a depressed worker in the plant dropped a Paxil on the floor,
the result might be to seed the plant and make it impossible from then on to produce pure anhydrate
there. For that matter, he might have dropped it on the floor of his bathroom at home, releasing crystals
that adhered to his skin or clothing.).
116 Id. at 1019-20.
"' Id. at 1020.
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or insect or animal, eventually cross with other strains of wild and
cultivated canola." 8  To further compound the issue, the genetic traits
conferred upon these GM crops, including glyphosate resistance, are
generally invisible to the naked eye. 119 Therefore, any farmer with even a
single plant contaminated by Roundup Ready pollen will unknowingly
create future generations of seeds and cause an exponential spread of the
resistant gene, as a canola plant can produce up to 100 new pods, each
containing 20 to 30 seeds.120 This exemplifies only a single contamination
event from a single field to a single farmer.
However, the reality is that over a billion acres of transgenic crops
have been grown to date.121 By releasing a self-propagating organism that
naturally spreads a patented gene, Monsanto effectively makes it impossible
for farmers of other strains of canola to avoid infringing their patents. The
equitable maxim of in pari delicto should be an available defense for any
farmer who has unintentionally grown crops containing patented genes, for
this infringement is a direct result of Monsanto forever altering the
ecological landscape. It should be noted that the appellate court in the
SmithKline case made the connection between releasing a self-propagating
entity into the environment and equitable relief, even creating a
hypothetical example based on a GM crop model:
This crystalline compound raises a question similar to one
that might arise when considering the invention of a fertile
plant or a genetically engineered organism, capable of
reproduction, released into the wild. Consider, for example,
what might happen if the wind blew fertile, genetically
modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of
a single farmer into neighboring cornfields. The harvest
from those fields would soon contain at least some patented
blue corn mixed in with the traditional public domain
yellow corn -thereby infringing the patent. The wind
would continue to blow, and the patented crops would
spread throughout the continent, thereby turning most (if
not all) North American corn farmers into unintentional,
yet inevitable, infringers. The implication - that the patent
"' See Rachid Sabbahi, Domingos de Oliveira & Jocelyn Marceau, Infuence of Honey Bee
(Hymenoptera: Apidae) Density on the Production of Canola (Crucifera: Brassicacae), 98(2) J. ECON.
ENTOMOLOGY 367, 368 (2005).
"9 Even worse than being invisible, for a farmer to test for Roundup Ready contamination,
the crops must be sprayed with Roundup, the result being that only the contaminant plants survive!
120 About Canola, MANITOBA CANOLA GROWERS, www.mcgacanola.org/about canola.cfm
(last visited August 10, 2011).
121 INT'L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, ISAAA BRIEF 39-
2008: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/39/executivesummary/
default.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
194 [Vol. 3 No. 2
INPARIDELICTO AND CROP GENE PATENTS
owner would be entitled to collect royalties from every
farmer whose cornfields contained even a few patented
blue stalks--cannot possibly be correct.l 22
Judge Posner's stance in SmithKline the Canadian Supreme
Court's in Schmeiser, both indicate a court's general
acknowledgement of the fundamental injustice of holding an
unintentional infringer liable when the party pursuing the
infringement made the act unavoidable. It is precisely a case like
this where the equitable defense of in pari delicto should be raised.
Equity demands that Monsanto should, under this maxim, be barred
from recovering on an infringement action arising out of the
unintentional use of their patented genes, for Monsanto itself bears
some of the responsibility for releasing an uncontainable gene-
spreading mechanism into the environment.
C Inducing Infringement under 35 USC §271(b)
35 U.S.C. §271(b) states that "whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." 23 Though a federal
statute, the induction of infringement stems from the common law theory of
respondeat superior. Specifically, one who aids or causes another to
infringe should be liable for infringement. Likewise, under §271(b) a
person who actively and knowingly aids and abets another's direct
infringement of a patent is liable for infringement.124 The language of this
section requires "active" inducement, and it is generally held that:
"[a]ctively inducing," like facilitating," requires an
affirmative act of some kind: Of course inducement has
connotations of active steps knowingly taken--knowingly at
least in the sense of purposeful, intentional as distinguished
from accidental or inadvertent. But with that qualifying
approach, the term is as broad as the range of actions by
which one in fact causes, or urges, or encourages, or aids
another to infringe a patent. 125
The court in SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward also made it clear that a
"specific intent to encourage another's infringement" of the patent is
122 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added).
123 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010).124 DONALD CHISUM, 5-17 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04 (Matthew Bender 2010).
125 Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing
Fromberg Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407,411 (5th Cir. 1963)).
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necessary under this section.126 The court in DSU Medical "addressed
the intent necessary to support a finding of induced infringement.
Under that rule, the plaintiff must show that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known that his actions would induce actual
infringements."l 27 This intent element is the facet of 271(b) that is
subject to the most contention in the judicial arena. One law review article
succinctly describes this tension by stating that:
Courts have routinely declared that 271(b) imposes liability
for "aiding and abetting" the commission of a legal wrong,
yet a clear definition of the mens rea required for
inducement liability has eluded even the Federal Circuit:
must a 271(b) plaintiff prove that the defendant specifically
intended to induce violation of the law, or is it sufficient to
prove that the defendant intended to induce the acts later
held to constitute infringement?1 28
In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., like in SEB
S.A., the court utilized the latter interpretation and found that "[t]he plaintiff
has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer's actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would
induce actual infringements."l 29 A UC Davis law review article exploring
the confusing implementation of 271(b) stated that "[t]o have intended to
encourage or aid infringement, a defendant must in fact understand that he
is encouraging an act of patent infringement." 30  Furthermore, "the more
integrally involved a defendant is in causing or encouraging the
infringement, the closer in culpability he should logically be considered to
the direct infringer."' 3 1
It seems natural that inducing infringement would, historically and
logically, be used offensively by plaintiffs to hold not only actual infringers
liable for infringement,132 but additionally those other parties that have
aided and abetted in the infringing activities. To this author's knowledge,
no case has proffered the inducing of infringement by the patent holder
126 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cit. 2010) (quoting
Broadcam Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
127 SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1376 (emphasis added) (citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471
F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
128 Recent Cases, Patent Law - Active Inducement of Infringement - District Court Holds
That Inducement Liability Requires Proof of Intent To Induce Violation of the Law, 115 HARv. L. REV.
1246, 1246 (2002)..
129 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
130 Mark Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 225, 243 (2005).
131 Id. at 242.
132 See 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (2010).
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themselves as an affirmative defense against such infringement action since
logically a patent holder can not infringe their own patent.
In the case of patented transgenes expressed by self-propagating
organisms that are permanently and irrevocably released into the
environment, the patent holder is willfully and knowingly, albeit indirectly,
forcing countless future parties, the identities of which remain unknown at
the time of release, to infringe their patent. In considering whether
Monsanto is effectively inducing innocent infringement with the release of
its Roundup Ready crops, the first element of inducing infringement need
not be discussed, for it is self-evident that Monsanto, the patent holder and
in this scenario the alleged inducer, is unequivocally aware of its own
patent. The question of whether Monsanto has effectively induced innocent
infringement thus turns on whether Monsanto has (1) actively induced the
innocent infringement by the farmers, and (2) possessed the specific intent
to induce actual infringement of their patented genes by said farmers.
In the context of the current discussion, the general meaning of the
word "induce" is to cause a party to act in a way in which they would have
not acted otherwise.133 By releasing self-propagating Roundup Ready crops
into the environment, Monsanto did induce innocent infringement, for their
action caused patented replicating vectors of transgenes to be released into
the global ecosystem. These vectors created, and will continue to create,
pollen and seeds that will further, unstoppably, propagate infringing
organisms well outside the control of Monsanto. When these seeds and
pollen land on a farmer's crop, these farmers have technically infringed
Monsanto's patent, but only because Monsanto made such infringement
unavoidable. These farmers have therefore involuntarily acted in a manner
in which they would not have otherwise acted but for Monsanto's actions.
The pivotal question is whether Monsanto possesses the specific
intent, as required by case law, to promote infringement of their patent by
farmers. If Monsanto knew or should have known that the release of self-
propagating Roundup Ready crops into the environment would cause pollen
and seed dispersal such that bystander farmers eventually would innocently
grow plants containing patented genes, then Monsanto does possess the
specific intent to induce infringement. What does Monsanto know? In
Monsanto's very own "Technology Use Guide" provided to farmers who
buy Roundup Ready seeds, Monsanto writes, "[s]ince corn is a naturally
cross-pollinated crop, a minimal amount of pollen movement (some of
which can carry genetically improved traits) between neighboring fields is a
133 Merriam-Webster, Induce, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/induce (last
visited Feb. 14, 2011) ("[(1)(a)] to move by persuasion or influence[; (b)] to call forth or bring about by
influence or stimulation[; (2)(a)] EFFECT, CAUSE[; (b)] to cause the formation of[; (c)] to produce (as
an electric current) by induction . . . .").
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well known and normal occurrence in corn seed or grain production." 134
The concession that pollen movement between fields is a "well known and
normal occurrence" is an unequivocal admission that Monsanto is aware of
the consequences of its release of self-replicating technology. Not just
Monsanto, but the scientific community as a whole is quite aware that
"crosspollination (also referred to as 'genetic drift') is unavoidable [and]
was confirmed by a British Royal Society report that found hybridization
between plants to be pervasive, frequent, and not limited by physical
barriers such as buffer zones."135 Though the scientific community as a
whole knows, and Monsanto admits, that pollen drift occurs generally, the
most persuasive evidence that Monsanto knows that the pollen drift directly
causes infringement comes from an officer of the company: Ray Mowling,
a vice president for Monsanto Canada in Mississauga, was cited as
"agree[ing] that some cross pollination occurs, and acknowledge[ing] the
awkwardness of prosecuting farmers who may be inadvertently growing
Monsanto seed through cross-pollination. . . . Though the general
knowledge of the scientific community, which should be arguably imputed
to the world's scientific leader in transgenic crop technology, is convincing
evidence, the actual admission that Monsanto knows with 100% certainty
that the release into the ecosystem of self-replicating transgenic Roundup
Ready crops actually causes pollen and seed dispersal forcing bystander
farmers to inadvertently infringe Monsanto's patents unquestionably
demonstrates the specific intent to induce infringement.
As traditionally applied, the doctrine of inducing infringement is
brought against a party other than the patent holder, and it is nonsensical to
think that a patent holder would sue themselves for infringement. From the
standpoint of equity, it makes sense in the limited circumstance of self-
propagating biological technology capable of disseminating patented genes,
that a patent owner can indeed induce others to infringe their own patent. If
Monsanto had covertly planted seeds on a farmer's property and later
claimed that farmer infringed their patent, it would be difficult to view a
finding of infringement as anything but an inequitable outcome. The same
principle of equity should apply when Monsanto releases the same genes
into the environment with reckless indifference and the full knowledge that
their genes will indeed cause unintentional infringement. A farmer growing
such unwanted crops is an infringer by the letter of the law, for there is no
134 ANDREW KIMBRELL & JOSEPH MENDELSON, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO V. U.S.
FARMERS 20 (2005), http://truefoodnow.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/cfsmonsantovsfarmerreport 1-13-
05.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting MONSANTO Co., 2005 TECHNOLOGY USE
GUIDE 17 (2005)).
1 Id. at 37.
13 Rich Weiss, Seeds of Discord: Monsanto's Gene Police Raise Alarm on Farmer 's Rights,
Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A6 (emphasis added)..
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element of intent in an infringement action. However, in this scenario,
Monsanto is culpable for inducing the infringement.
The courts have applied the common law defense of laches under
the guidance of 35 USC §281, and injunctive relief under 35 USC §283
which follows "principles of equity." It is therefore no great leap for the
courts to apply the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto-barring an
infringement action arising out of the unintentional use of patented genes
when the plaintiff bears responsibility for releasing an uncontainable gene-
spreading mechanism into the environment-relying on the underlying
principles and intent of 35 USC §271(b). Specifically, as it applies to the
scenario at hand, Monsanto should be barred from recovering infringement
damages (§271(a)) arising out of Monsanto's own misconduct which is
violative of the principles enveloped by §271(b). Where there is
misconduct on the side of both parties, the position of the defendant is
stronger.
VII. CONCLUSION
Transgenic crop technology will continue to be utilized, and patent
holders will undoubtedly continue to assert their rights to prevent
unauthorized use of their technology via litigation. The uncontrolled spread
of patented genes is an unquestionable certainty due to the self-propagating
nature of plants. The current standards of §271(a) infringement, when
rigidly and traditionally applied, leave no room for farmers to escape
liability when they are merely victims of unintentional "contamination" of
their crops with patented genes. 137 This result is not in accord with general
standards of justice, and therefore an equitable defense should be available
to farmers, for "[e]quity looks beneath rigid rules to find substantial justice
and has the power to prevent strict rules from working an injustice." 38
There is no "innocent infringement" defense codified in patent law, and
court dicta only allude to such an idea. Invoking the equitable maxim of in
pari delicto as an affirmative defense should prohibit a plaintiff, such as
Monsanto, from recovering damages arising out of misconduct for which
they bear at least some responsibility, for such infringing use is absolutely
unavoidable due to the nature of plant genetics and reproduction. The
arguments for such an equitable defense are, at the time of writing, only
legal theory and therefore not tested or implemented by the courts. To
promote certainty and, more importantly, justice, Title 35 of the United
States Code should be amended to add a provision that embodies the legal
discussion herein. Thus, parties who can show a likelihood of innocent
137 See 35 U.S.C. §271 (2010).
138 Knauer, 348 F.3d at 237.
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patented gene use, where a living self-propagating gene was knowingly
released into the environment, should escape liability for infringement.
200
